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INTRODUCrION AND GENERAL MATTERS
A. History and Ground Rules
The causes of the 1830s 'Great Trek' of Afrikaner farmers from British rule
in the Cape of Good Hope were complex but probably would have been
perceived by them to be a matter of the 'human rights' of a people with
roots in the country going back close to two centuries. South African
history until the very late twentieth century is a long chapter of the asser-
tion of perceived rights to land, wealth and opportunity with the 'human
rights' of twenty-first century discourse hardly known} South Africa's
1990s moral and social revolution was, of course, primarily to do with the
gross and manifest denial of human rights to a majority people by their
minority national fellows. The title of this chapter is a trite reminder that
the solution sought by South Africa reflects the country's history; the
present treatment, however, aims to do no more than comment on 'the here
and the now' regarding the role of comparative law in the development of
human rights in post-reform South Africa.
Since the advent of the 1996 Constitution3 (hereafter 'the Constitution'),
complete with its Bill of Rights and new Constitutional Court, South
African law has been on a voyage of discovery in the field of human rights.
1 Responsibility for errors and imperfections in this paper are mine alone. That said, I am
very grateful to acknowledge a significant contribution by Grace Mowat (Hons LLB, DipLP,
Aberd) who worked as my research assistant, first, at the University of Cape Town and, subse-
quently, in Aberdeen. I also acknowledge the contribution of Anne Pope, Private Law,
University of Cape Town, both for her kind guidance of Grace Mowat's research and for valu-
able comments.
2 See TRH Davenport, South Africa: a Modern History, 4th edn (London: Macmillan,
1991),44 and generally.
3 The ConstitUtion of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
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The South African Courts have been entrusted with the demanding task of
steering the new constitutional democracy on a true and safe passage down
the road to the values reflected in an ambitious constitution. On this jour-
ney, the courts-and, in particular, the Constitutional Court-have had to
decide on a wide range of difficult issues. While a domestic factor-some-
times strong-is often present, South Africa's relatively late commencement
on the human rights' journey means that a useful choice of foreign route
map of precedents is available. In this regard the Constitution itself gives
scope for comparisons, not only by changing the foundations of the law,
but also by setting out ground rules on its own interpretation
An interpretation section provides that, a court, tribunal or forum, in
interpreting the Bill of Rights, 'must consider International law' and 'may
consider foreign law'.4 This section's wording replaces the more specific but
less appropriate wording of the interim Constitution which stated that an
interpreting court 'shall, where applicable, have regard to public interna-
tionallaw' and 'may have regard to comparable foreign case law'.5
The Constitution's tacit invitation to courts to apply a comparative
method is consistent with an approach which came to be reflected in the
formative twentieth-century development of South African law. The 'mixed
system' character of the law-inherent in its Roman-Dutch and English law
primary chemistry-represents a starting-point, which makes it natural to
think in terms of possible alternative solutions rather than to regard law as
an institution which must be accepted for 'better or worse'. As early as
1962, TB Smith, the noted Scots exponent of comparative law, observed
that '[t]he jurisprudence of South Africa is of particular interest to the
genuine student of comparative law. ..'6 While one may criticise the appar-
ent emphasis of South African law on its European heritage largely to the
exclusion of the thinking of Africa and African law,7 this is not to deny the
system's established capacity in comparative law, in large measure devel-
oped in the context of a tension involving civilian and Anglo-American
common law solutions.8
4 Section 39(1)(b)&.(c).
5 Section 35(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
6 Studies Critical and Comparative (Edinburgh: W Green, 1962), xxxii. South African law
is prominent in a recent major template-based work on mixed systems; see V Palmer (ed),
Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 ).
7 See the preface comments of Professor TW Bennett in his Sourcebook of Customary Law
for Southern Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 1991), v; see also, generally, TW Bennett, The
Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa, (Cape Town: Juta, 1985); see also my
comment in 'South Africa: a World in one Country on the Long Road to Reality', in A Harding
and E Oriicii (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (The Hague/London: Kluwer,
2002),281,283-4.
8 See the introduction of R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds), Southern Cross: Civil Law
and Common Law in South Africa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.
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B. Prescribed Routes and Signposting
The founding provisions of the Constitution represent overriding aims in
the sense of what must be achieved to meet the new entrenched values. The
first-stated value of '[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms'9 is especially significant. In a
subsequent section the Constitution provides for the application of the Bill
of Rights by a court, the following provisions being critical: '(a) in order to
give effect to a right in the Bill, [a court] must apply, or if necessary develop,
the comm<}n law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that
right; and (b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right
provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).'10 The
interpretation clause, already referred to, reiterates this message in unam-
biguous terms: 'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights'.ll Considering
these two sections together one commentator has noted that 'there are no
legal question left in South Africa to which the Bill of Rights is simply and
inherently irrelevant'.12
The significance of the Bill of Rights being beyond doubt, it is important
for present purposes to observe that the 'may consider foreign law'13 provi-
sion is part of the section which establishes the basis of the approach to the
Bill's interpretation. The South African debate concerning the protection of
human rights has been very much informed by developments in other states.
The pages of the South African Journal of Human Rights testify to the
extent of this influence of foreign jurisprudence which, of course, is associ-
ated with subscription to a number of relevant international treaties.14
The mixed character of South African law throughout its formative
development has engendered judicial receptiveness to foreign jurisprudence
and juristic writings.15 Now, with a positive mandate to take forward the
9 Section l(a).
10 Section 8(3); in providing for the possible linlitation of rights provided for in the Bill of
Rights s 36(1) lays down that limitation may be 'only in terms of law of general application
to the extent that the linlitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic soci-
ety based on human dignity, equality and freedom. ..'.
11 Section 39(2).
12 S Ellmann, 'A Constitutional Confluence: American "State Action" Law and he
Application of South Mrica's Socio-economic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors', in P
Andrews and S Ellmann, Post-Apartheid Constitutions (Johannesburg and Athens:
WitWatersrand University Press and Ohio University Press, (OH) 2001),457.
13 Section 39(1)(c).
14 See J Sisk and A Pronto 'The International Human Rights Norms in South Africa: the
Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee' (1995) 11 SAJHR 438.
15 See HR Hahlo and E Kahn, The South African Legal System and its Background (Cape
Town: Juta, 1968),324-5.
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norms of the Bill of Rights, the courts are likely to be more proactive in
finding relevant material and, of course, the pool to be trawled is far more
extensive than what tended to be perceived as appropriate sources before
the advent of a bill of rights.
The Constitutional Court, in ruling on the death penalty, noted the
significance of comparative human rights jurisprudence pending the devel-
opment of a body of domestic jurisprudence but added a qualification:
Comparative 'bill of rights' jurisprudence will no doubt be of importance, particu-
larly in the early stages of the transition when there is no developed indigenous
jurisprudence in this branch of the law on which to draw. Although we are told by
s 35(1) that we 'may' have regard to foreign case law, it is important to appreciate
that this will not necessarily offer a safe guide to the interpretation. ..of our
Constitution. This has already been pointed out in a number of decisions. ..and is
implicit in the injunction given to the Courts in s 35(1), which in permissive terms
allows the Courts to 'have regard to' such law. There is no injunction to do more
than this.16
In a subsequent case, concerned with the right to criminal trial within a
reasonable time under section 25 of the interim Constitution, the Court
drew attention to some of the potential pitfalls involved:
Comparative research is generally valuable and is all the more so when dealing with
problems new to our jurisprudence but well developed in mature constitutional
democracies. Both the interim and the final Constitutions, moreover, indicate that
comparative research is either mandatory or advisable. ..Nevertheless the use of
foreign precedent requires circumspection and acknowledgement that transplants
require careful managemenv7
The Court proceeded to show that resort to relevant tests developed in the
United States requiring the assertion of a right to expeditious trial would be
inappropriate in South Mrica where the majority of accused persons are
unrepresented and have a limited conception of the right to a speedy trial.
Indeed, the Court took the view that following US precedents would 'strike
a pen through the right as far as the most vulnerable members of our soci-
ety are concerned'.18
The need for interpretation with the emphasis on domestic conditions
was seen as fundamental in the right to expeditious trial decision. But in a
country with extreme poverty and a history of endemic discrimination,19
can rights to property and housing be usefully compared to formulations
16 S V Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391(CC) para 37 (per President Chaskalson).
17 Sanderson V Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC), para 26. See J de
Waal, I Currie, and G Erasmus, Bill of Rights Handbook, 4th edn (Cape Town: Juta, 2001),
142-3 where the learned authors review South African case law which cautions against too
ready resort to foreign jurisprudence. 18 Idem.
19 See DL Carey Miller and A Pope, Land Title in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2000),
ch 1 ('The Development of Discriminatory Landholding').
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applying in established constitutional democracies? A leading South African
expert on constitutional property rights urges 'extensive use of examples
from a wide range of foreign law' to serve the purposes of being alerted to
problems encountered elsewhere and to allow analysis of the 'different
approaches, arguments, tendencies and trends in the solution of these prob-
lems ...'20 The writer goes on to deal with the issue of the particular
circumstances of South Mrica and argues that this factor does not justify
unnecessary scepticism.
To consider foreign law does not necessarily commit the courts to following foreign
law-on the contrary, reference to foreign law can often be useful in avoiding mistakes
made elsewhere. Moreover, it seems logical that a decision not to follow foreign law
should result from rather than preclude consideration of foreign law. .}1
On the particular issue of the use in South Africa of the case law of the
United States Supreme Court, one writer notes the 'differences in constitu-
tionallanguage, history, and social construct' as a barrier to the adoption
of US precedents.22
C. Clearing Past Debris from the Road Ahead
South Africa has sought to embark on its journey of human rights' discov-
ery as it were with the slate wiped clean. Always high on the agenda of the
outgoing white minority government, the interim Constitution of 199323
contained a mandate for amnesty legislation which, when passed, brought
into being the Truth and Reconciliation Commission}4 A decision to deal
with past abuses of human rights, before venturing forward on the basis of
entrenched protective norms, has featured in processes of national transi-
tion in a number of states in recent times}5 The common denominator of
these systems is the compromise feature on the basis of which absolution
from the burden of the past is perceived as essential to prospects for a stable
future. But, of course, the process is certain to be fraught and complex}6
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation model has its apologists27 and its
20 AJ van der Walt, The Constitutional Property Clause (Cape Town: Juta, 1997),5-6.
21 Ibid.
22 RC Blake 'The Frequent Irrelevance of us Judicial Decisions in South Africa' (1999) 15
SA~HR 192, 199.
See, generally, H Corder 'Towards a South African Constitution' (1994) MLR 57,491.
24 See the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
25 For a recent evaluation see WP Nagan and L Atkins 'Conflict Resolution and Democratic
Transformation: Confronting the Shameful Past-Prescribing a Humane Future' (2002) SALJ
119,174.26 See S Cohen, States of Denial (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
27 See, eg, South African Constitutional Court Judge S Sandile Ngcobo, 'Truth, Justice and
Amnesty in South Africa', in Ius Gentium (the journal of the Center for International and
Comparative Law of the University of Baltimore), forthcoming, 2003.
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critics.28 The difficulty in denying the pursuit of justice in cases of wicked
abuse perpetrated in the immediate past regime is that this does not fit, in
moral terms, with the wholehearted adoption of a human rights culture. At
the same time, the South African solution is a serious endeavour to address
a vexed problem. That the emphasis is, indeed, on the future is borne out
by the creation of a Human Rights Commission.29
D. Choice of Routes, Structural Affinity Showing the Way
Comparative work played a major part in the development which eventu-
ally led to the South Mrican Constitution of 1996. It is trite to observe that
when root and branch institutional reconstruction takes place there is scope
for the reception of completely new controlling features. In this situation
the comparative constitutional lawyer can travel far and wide but, of
course, limitations of context apply.3o Foreign influence was present in the
development of the interim Constitution31 and in its revision to arrive at the
final document. The category of rights provided for in the Bill of Rights was
influenced by various countries including Canada, India, and the United
States.32
Aspects of the South African constitutional dispensation reflect particu-
lar borrowing. Although affinity between the legal systems of Canada and
South Mrica do not immediately spring to mind, Canadian jurisprudence
has come to be significant. This can be traced to the formulation of the Bill
of Rights and, in particular, the general limitation provisions-which
control the often critical issue of the justification for the restriction of a
potentially protected right. Professor van der Walt notes the fact of this
borrowing and its significance.
The general limitation clause ...in the South Mrican bill of rights was probably
copied from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, and consequently
the Canadian example will probably weigh heavily in the interpretation and appli-
cation of this provision.33
The successive South Mrican constitutions of 1993 and 1996 are very much
representative of the period of liberating political transition and compre-
28 See, eg, S Wilson, 'The Myth of Restorative Justice: Truth Reconciliation and the Ethics
of Amnesty' (2001) 17 SAJHR, 531.
29 See 55 181 & 184 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19%.
30 See H Klug, 'Participating in the Design: Constitution-making in South Africa', in
Andrews and Ellmann, above n 12, 128, 134-5.
31 See, eg, J de Waal 'A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the
Interim Bill of Rights' (1995) 11 SAJHR, 1.
32 H Ebrahim, 'The Making of the South African Constitution: Some Influences', in
Andrews and Ellmann, above n 12, 85, 88.
33 See above n 20, 81-2.
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hensive social reform in which they were written. That this underlying basis
should be reflected in the interpretation of wording--0ften abstract-
would appear to be obvious. In some instances, for the avoidance of doubt,
the requirement is spelled out; as, for example, in the provision in the prop-
erty clause that '[n]o provision of this section may impede the state from
taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination. ..'34
That the Constitutional Court has led the way in developing a 'contextual'
approach to interpretation in Bill of Rights cases is not surprising. A dictum
of the President, following on from the passage quoted,35 states the position
in straightforward terms:
In dealing with comparative law we must bear in mind that we are required to
construe the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the
Constitution of some foreign country, and that this has to be done with due regard
to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language
of our own Constitution.36
Contextual thinking has also led to Canadian jurisprudence through the
fundamental affinity deriving from the limitation clause relationship
already referred to.37 A contextual inquiry becomes relevant at the limita-
tion stage in a two-stage process in which '[i]n the first stage, context may
only be used to establish the purpose or meaning of a provision.'38 This link
with the judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court has been noted in the
South Mrican literature.
In applying this approach, the Court has often found guidance in the more recent
decisions of the Canadian Supreme Coun, and in line with these decisions, has often
referred to the historical context in which the interim and 1996 Constitutions were
adopted.39
A two-stage process avoids the risk of 'still-born' rights because the right is
actually identified before any limitation is prescribed. But, of course, the
particular text must rule. Accordingly, regarding the duty of the state to
provide medical care and treatment, the relevant right ('health care, food,
water and social security') is provided for in a 'constitutional command04o
subject to specified limits-'[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the p~ogressive
realisation of each of these rights.'41
34 Section 25(8). 35 See above, n 16. 36 Ibid, para 39.
37 See above, n 32. 38 See de Waal, Currie, and Eras mus, n 16, 139-40.
39 p de Vos 'A Bridge too far?' (2001) 17 SAJHR, 1,7.
40 See E de Wet, The Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (Durban:
Butterworths, 1996),117-19.41 Section 27(2). See Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natall998 (1) SA 765
(CC).
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Where the normal two-stage process applies a comparative approach has
been prevalent, with an interesting shift of comparative source, evident as a
result of the modification of the interim Constitution's limitations provision
in the final Constitution of 1996. Professor van der Walt notes that '[t]he
comparative use of German law on limitations was also affected by changes
in the limitations clause of the 1996 Constitution.'42 As the learned writer
goes on to show, German jurisprudence on 'the proportionality test'
remains influential, with Canadian43 and European Court of Human
Rights material also playing a part.44
E. Map-reading Expertise Problem
Clearly, the Constitution cannot be interpreted using only the methods of
statutory interpretation developed-with much assistance from English
law-in the pre-reform era. But what may be natural and straightforward
for the Constitutional Court, with its critical function of ultimate interpre-
tation, does not, of course, necessarily hold for the ordinary courts even
though all courts are charged, in terms of section 8,45 with the function of
giving effect to the constitution. In remarks described as 'startling'46 a High
Court Judge commented:
During argument counsel referred me to Canadian judgements and others in the
USA. They are, at face value, support for the conclusions I have come to. As I know
nothing about the hierarchy of these Courts I hesitate to quote their judgements in
support of my view.47
While this statement might be seen as questionable from a rational point of
view, it is not unreasonable for a court to want to be fully informed regard-
ing a foreign precedent. In comparative law 'a little knowledge' may well be
a 'dangerous thing'. Plainly, a high level of expertise is a prerequisite. In this
regard specialist academic work is clearly valuable. South Mrican law has
been well served by specialist comparative literature in both periodical48
and monograph form.49
42 See above n 20, 88.
43 In the typical Anglo-American tradition a particular case (R v Oakes (1986) CRR 308)
has been a primary source of influence.
44 See above n 20, 88-90.
45 See above n 10.
46 (1999) 15 SAJHR, 393, 397.
47 Langemaat V Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (T) 316.
48 The South African Journal on Human Rights has proved to be a most valuable vehicle.
49 See, eg, Van der Walt, above n 19; Erika de Wet, above n 40.
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R Case Law-Guide Book or Map?
A comparative law factor is present in a range of areas of development of
human rights jurisprudence in South Africa, and in a number of areas it is
prominent. In the present contribution the sample considered must neces-
sarily be a limited one. Examples will be taken from three areas: the rela-
tively specialised property right/land reform interface; the wide area of
freedom of religion and expression and the rapidly developing category of
equality rights labelled 'sexual orientation'.
It has been suggested that 'the purpose of extensive reference to foreign
law should be, first, to take note of the problems of interpretation and
application that have already been uncovered there, and, secondly, to
observe and analyse different approaches, arguments, tendencies, and
trends'so in order to better reach a conclusion as to how to deal with the
problem in hand. Does the case law bear this out? Applying the apposite
travel metaphor-which must be credited to my research assistant-does
foreign jurisprudence fulfil a general guide-book role or is its function the
more specific one of a map?
II. EVIDENCE FROM lHREE AREAS
A. Property
1. The right to property and land reform
The protracted and sometimes polarised debate,51 which eventually led to
the property clause in the 1996 Constitution's Bill of Rights, was informed-
and, to some extent, fuelled-by consideration of the property clauses of
foreign jurisdictions.52 But the priority of how to deal with the legacy of
apartheid's unfair deprivation of property affecting the majority of South
Africans made the debate an intensely political one.53 Emphasis upon the
need for far-reaching reform put into question the desirability of protecting
property rights. On the other hand, however, those seeking the maintenance
of the property status quo urged for a blanket protection of property
formula. The Constitutional Court rejected the notion of a universally
50 Van der Walt, above n 20, 6.
51 See de Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, above n 17,410: '[t]he inclusion of a constitutional
right to property in both the interim and final Constitutions was the subject of a great deal of
controversy.'52 See, eg, M Chaskalson 'The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional
Protection of Property in the United States and the Commonwealth' (1993) 9 SAJHR 388.
53 See K Savage, 'Negotiating South Mrica's New Constitution: an Overview of the Key
Players and the Negotiation Process', in Andrews and Ellmann, above n 12,164,176-81.
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accepted norm of protection of property, citing the absence of a clause in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 and the New
Zealand Bill of Rights of 1990.54 Some valuable academic work has
demonstrated the utility of a comparative approach in arriving at a sophis-
ticated understanding of the role and working of property clauses.55 At the
more particular level of the problem of remedying historical deprivation
while respecting existing rights, appropriate comparators are not easily
found. However, in one important piece of work, the restitution of land
rights in former East Germany was compared with the constitutionally
driven process under South Africa's Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of
1994.56
2. Restitution of land rights
In re Kranspoort Communiey57 involved the claim of a former mission
settlement community to land owned by the Dutch Reformed Church on
the basis of alleged dispossession through racially discriminatory law or
practice. The entire ambit of legislative requirements for entitlement under
the restitution Act was in issue,58 and the Court-noting that 'a number of
provisions. ..must be interpreted for the first time'59-conducted a
comprehensive review of the law. However, in common with other land
reform legislation matters, the specific character of the statute leaves little
scope for recourse to foreign material. The only significant feature of this
case, from a comparative perspective, is in the negative point of the Court's
contrasting the civilian based South African law and English law on the
issue of the sufficiency of possession for the purposes of the concept of
'beneficial occupation' under the Act.60 The effective rejection of the possi-
ble precedent of English law illustrates the confidence of South African law
with regard to its common law sources.61
54 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1996 (4) SA
744(CC), paras 71-4. This was the process in which the Constitutonal Court reviewed the
draft constitution produced by the first democratically elocted government for compliance
with the constitutional principles which had been agreed in the 1991-3 political negotiations-
see Hugh Corder 'Towards a South Mrican Constitution' (1994) 57 MLR 491.
55 See, generally, Van der Walt, above n 20; see also the particular example of DG Kleyn,
'The Constitutional Protection of Property: a Comparison between the German and the South
African approach' (1996) 11 SAPL 402.
56 Daniel Visser and Theunis Roux, 'Giving Back the Country: South Mrica's Restitution of
Land Rights Act, 1994' in MR Rwelamira and G Werle (eds), Confronting Past In;UStices,
(Durban: Bunerworths, 1996), 94.
57 Re Kranspoort Community 2000 (2) SA 124.
58 DL Carey MilIer and Anne Pope, Land Title in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2000),
326-33.
59 Re Kranspoort Community, para 29. 60 Paras 64-6.
61 See DL Carey MilIer 'A new property?' (1999) 116 SALJ, 749, 757-8.
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On the issue of the appropriate test for interdict relief in a restitution
context, the Land Claims Court referred to leading decisions of the House
of Lords62 and the South African Appellate Division63 in support of the
'balance of convenience' criterion.64 Technically, this reference to a House
of Lords decision is superfluous, given the presence of authority of the high-
est South African court of the time.
3. Aboriginal title
The decision in Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and
Another65 illustrates the readiness of the Land Claims Court to adopt a
comparative approach where this is appropriate. In this landmark decision
the Court held that it was not empowered to develop the common law in
realisation of the concept of aboriginal title: 'That doctrine, if it is part of
South African law, still needs to be developed. It is an alternative remedy to
restitution under the Restitution Act, and falls outside this Court's jurisdic-
tion.'66
This decision leaves scope for a claim that an act of dispossession
infringed a common law right of aboriginal title and so amounted to a
deprivation of property contrary to the Bill of Rights' Property Clause.67
The better view would appear to be that it would have to be established
that there is scope for the doctrine in the context of the comprehensive
programme of land reform legislation and, in particular, the limitation of
restitution to post 1913 deprivations as specifically provided for in the Bill
of Rights.68 In this regard it is significant that, in arriving at the programme
of land reform provided for in the Property Clause, it appears to have been
accepted that the process should avoid the disruptive effect of putting all
existing titles under potential threat by allowing historic or ancestral land
claims to be entertained.69
There are two distinct but associated issues: first, whether aboriginal title
is justiciable as a matter of South Mrican common law or of international
law and, if so, the overriding question of scope for the doctrine in the
context of the Constitution. Clearly, foreign decisions would need to be
considered in determining the issue of the standing of the concept of aborig-
inal title. In the Richtersveld case70 the Land Claims Court referred to deci-
62 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (HL).
63 Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Wa"enton & another 1973 (3) SA 685
(A).
64 Chief Nchabeleng v Chief Phasha 1998 (3) SA 578 (LCC).
65 2001 (3) SA 1293 (CC). 66 Per Gildenhuys AJ, para 48.
67 Section 25(1) of the ConstitUtion of 1996. 68 Section 25(7).
69 See Carey Miller & Pope, above n 19,315-17.
70 See above n 65, para 45.
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sions of the us Supreme Court71 and the Australian High Court72 for the
purpose of noting the recognition and nature of the doctrine relied upon by
the claimants.
If the aboriginal title issue comes to be adjudicated on in the
Constitutional Court it will be interesting to see how the Court interprets
the property clause. An emphasis upon the broad notion of property, as
demonstrated in certain foreign jurisprudence, would be receptive to
aboriginal title.73 On the other hand, the Court might well take the view
that the South African property clause represents a closed domestic agenda
in its emphasis on a specified programme of land reform.
4. Buria/ rights
In Buhrmann v Nkosi and Another. 74 the Full Bench of the Transvaal High
Court, in a majority judgment, upheld an appeal concerned with the extent
of the rights of an 'occupier' under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act
62 of 1997 (ESTA). This legislation enhances the rights of occupiers of rural
land with the owner's consent, a necessary consequence of the reform being
some erosion of an owner's common law rights. Specifically, the issue was
whether the occupier's right to use of the land, as provided for in the Act,
included burial rights.
The occupier urged that the basis of a right of burial existed in provisions
in the Act concerned with freedom of religion75 and 'family life in accor-
dance with the culture of that family',76 these rights being set in the general
context of the promotion of the human rights of dignity, privacy and free-
dom. The majority took the view that because the Act intended a balance
between an occupier's rights of residence and the landowner's right of
ownership, interpretation should not extend beyond what a right of resi-
dence encompassed. The correlative of this interpretation was a necessarily
restricted position on the scope of the right of freedom of religion insofar
as this might support a right of burial deriving from the right of occupation.
Satchwell ], giving one of the two majority judgments, cites a Canadian
decision 77 referred to in a South African textbook 78 defining the concept of
freedom of religion in terms of rights of freedom to entertain, practice and
71 Oneida Indian Nation of New York V Country of Oneida, 414 US 661 (1974) (39 L Ed
2d 73).
72 Mabo and Others v The State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
73 An approach of this sort would appear to be supported by Professor AJ van der Walt in
his The Constitutional Property Clause, 1997 and Constitutional Property Clauses, 2000. See
above n 20.
74 2000 (1) SA 1145 TPD. 75 Section 5(d).
76 Section 6(2)(d).
77 R v Big M Dmg Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC),353.
78 M Chaskalson et al, Constitutional Law of South Africa (Cape ToW11: Jura, 1996), 19.2.
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disseminate any particular religious view. The limitation of the right of free-
dom of religion to an essentially western first-world perception of the ambit
of religious belief by the majority, of course, fits with their position that the
core issue concerned an adjustment of property rights.
The minority judgment of Judge President Ngoepe interprets the right of
freedom of religion and belief to give emphasis to practice. Citing the
express inclusion of the right to practice religious belief79 in the 1981
African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the 1990 Namibian
Constitution, the learned judge observes that 'no right can be said to be
meaningful if the holder is prohibited from practising it or materialising
it.'sO The opinion proceeds on the basis that the right of freedom of religion
is universally understood and not open to reinterpretation in terms of
particular legislative provisions. 'Section 6 cannot reasonably be interpreted
as creating a new understanding of that right or its content different from
the way such a right is ordinarily understood, not only under our
Constitution, but universally.'Sl
Giving greater emphasis to the importance of the religious practice
aspect and, at the same time, concluding that the inroad into property
rights-in the limited circumstances of the rights of an 'occupier' under
ESTA-was not a significant one, Ngoepe JP concluded, contrary to the
majority view, that the respondent's claim to a burial right should be recog-
nised.
A preference for African over first-world Western thinking regarding the
meaning and scope of 'religion and belief' appears to be implicit in the
dissenting opinion of Ngoepe JP:
To acknowledge the respondent's right to practice and manifest her religion, but bar
her from interring her son at a place and in a manner that would give meaning to
her right of religion and belief could amount to no more than paying lip service to
such a right.82
79 Section 15 (1): 'everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief
and opinion.'
80 2000 (1) SA 1145 TPD, 1160.
81 2000 (1) SA 1145 TPD, 1161.
82 Ibid. In NkosiandAnother v Buhrmann 2002(1) SA 372 (SCA) the decision of the major-
ity was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a primary aspect of the decision being the
inherent problem of justifying the diminution of a landowner's patrimony on the basis of an
interpretation of the right of freedom of religion. AJ van der Walt, in a critical analysis
('Property Rights v Religious Rights' (2002) 13 Stell LR 394), concluded that, while the
conservative approach taken was not inconsistent with authority, it inhibits desirable develop-
ment through consideration of balancing and proportionality issues, necessary in evaluation
removed from any preconceived position.
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5. Housing
Property and housing are associated matters but, of course, involve entirely
distinct rights. The Bill of Rights protects the right of property and sets out
the entrenched83 land reform agenda. The right to housing is expressed as
the right, which everyone has, 'to have access to adequate housing'; the
scope of this right being clarified by the provision that '[t]he state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation ...'84 In Government of the Republic of
South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others.85 the Constitutional
Court interpreted the right to housing. Grootboom and others claimed state
housing provision after their eviction from land unlawfully occupied; the
Cape High Court upheld the claim ruling that 'tents, portable latrines and
a regular supply of water. ..would constitute the bare minimum'.86
The Constitutional Court had confirmed the justiciability of the socio-
economic rights provided for in the Constitution in the First Certification
case.87 In Grootboom the Court noted that socio-economic rights were at
least 'negatively protected from improper invasion'.88 Regarding the prob-
lem of establishing criteria in the area of socio-economic rights the leading
textbook authors note the relevance of the United Nations (UN) material,
because the provisions of 'the South African Constitution were modelled on
those in the Covenant', and observe that the UN 'comments on state reports
are a valuable source of guidance for South Mrican courts'.89 In this regard
the difficulty of finding comparable foreign case law is noted 'because
South Mrica is only one of a few jurisdictions to incorporate an extensive
list of [directly justiciable] socio-economic rights into its Constitution'.90
According to the authors, Sri Lanka, Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal do
this while most jurisdictions-including Brazil, India and Ireland-recog-
nise these rights as 'directive principles of state policy' which are not
directly justiciable.91 A comparative approach would have needed to look
beyond South Mrica's usual comparators, none of which would have hous-
ing crises resembling that represented in Grootboom. Yacoob J's quota-
tion92 from the judgment of Chaskalson P in Soobramoney93 well
83 See S 25(8): 'No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, to redress the results of past racial
discrimination.'
84 Section 26 (1) & (2); s 26 (3) provides that '[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or
have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the rdevant
circumstances' and '[n]o legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.'
85 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 86 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) 293.
87 See n 53, para 78. 88 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 78; see also para 34.
89 De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus, n 17,437. 90 Ibid, 437 at above n 21.
91 Ibid.
92 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 25.
93 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natall998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
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illustrates the point: 'Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions
and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate
social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate
health services.'
Grootboom proceeds on the premise of acceptance of the importance of
socio-economic rights acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in
Soobramoney.94 Noting that section 39 required relevant international law
to be considered as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the Court95
referred to President Chaskalson's dictum in the death penalty case96 and
went on to consider the provisions of the UN Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural rights and the 'minimum core obligation' concept devel-
oped by the relevant UN Committee. The Court found, however, that given
the significant national variations in the circumstances and needs applying
to housing, it lacked sufficient information to determine the 'minimum core
obligation'.97
The need to balance the right to Human Dignity with the available
resources of the state is the most significant aspect of the final decision, with
the Court pointing out that the realisation of these rights would be progres-
sive-'-the most urgent need being dealt with first.98
Grootboom has been characterised as the start of a new land reform
jurisprudence which 'could open up the jurisprudential imagination to
search for alternatives by placing emphasis on the position of the most
marginalised and vulnerable members of society'.99 This is true to the
extent that the right to housing is, in a certain sense, the land reform
agenda 's positive right to property-in contrast to the land reform agenda
rights proper which are negative in the sense of being limitations upon the
general right to property. As such, the right to housing does have significant
potential for development.
6. General use of comparative law in land reform context
The specific nature of the land reform legislation, crafted to meet the
perceived needs of post-apartheid South Africa, means that the scope for
recourse to foreign jurisprudence is limited on issues central to the various
particular reform measures. But, of course, specific legislation may well
involve general concepts which gives room for a comparative approach. At
the least significant level the reference to foreign material may be no more
than by way of confirmation of domestic authority.l00
94 See above n 43, 7 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 25. 95 Para 26.
96 See above n 16. 97 Para 33. 98 Para 45.
99 AJ van der Walt 'Dancing with Codes-Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing
Pr&r:rty Righrs in a Constitutional State' (2001) 118 SALJ 258,305.
1 See above n 64.
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In a multiple claim restitution matterlOl the Land Claims Court had to
decide whether claims were barred because 'just and equitable' compensa-
tion was paid at the time of dispossession. In interpreting the Bill of Rights
compensation formula intended to elucidate the 'just and equitable' crite-
rion, the Court noted that, the compensation formula being new in South
Africa, '[d]irections for its interpretation and implementation may be
sought from international and foreign law.'lo2 Observing that in the 1996
Constitution Certification caselO3 the Constitutional Court had commented
on the 'the wide range of criteria for expropriation and the payment of
compensation' in international conventions and foreign constitutions, the
Land Claims Court stated its approach:
Some guidance can be obtained from formulae applicable in other jurisdictions,
although even they provide no certain answers. I will now proceed to examine how
criteria for the determination of compensation in countries which have constitu-
tional prerequisites for the expropriation of property that are similar to ours, have
been developed and applied.l04
A wide-ranging comparative survey follows. Covering the USA,
Switzerland, Malaysia, Australia, Germany, and the European Convention
on Human Rights, it is apparent that the Court's research has been
informed by certain general texts. Professor van der Walt's Constitutional
Property Clauses,los cited a number of times, is a major source. It is also
interesting to note reference to a work on the precise subject of compensa-
tion arising from expropriation in the UK National Committee of
Comparative Law Series.lO6 The conclusion which the Court arrives at on
the basis of this survey is that '[t]he position in other countries indicate a
central role for market value in the determination of compensation.'lO7 This
may seem a trite point, however, it is important in confirming the Court's
conclusion that market value is the primary 'readily quantifiable'los consid-
eration of the factors itemised in the property clause.lo9
101 The Former Highlands Residents concerning the Area Formerly Known as the Highlands
(now Newlands Ext 2) District of Pretoria; Ash & others v Department of Land Affairs [2000]
2 All SA 26 (LCC).
102 Para 26; referring to s 39 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1996 Constitution.
103 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744
(CC) 799.
104 Former Highlands Residents, para 26.
105 See above n 20.
106 GM Erasmus, Compensation for Expropriation (UK Comparative Law Series, vol 11,
Oxford: Reese/UKNCCL 1990).
107 Former Highlands Residents, para 34.
108 Ibid.
109 Section 25(3) (aHe).
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B. Freedom of Religion/Expression
1. Basic position
In considering the property clause, the foreign jurisprudence factor was
examined in a range of distinct aspects of land reform because the particu-
lar context tends to control the scope for a comparative method. In the free-
dom of religion/expession area, however, there is more room for discretion.
The approach will, accordingly, be from the general perspective of the
extent to which a comparative method is applied-by reference to a small
sample of relevant cases.
The connected human rights of 'freedom of religion, belief and opinion'
and 'freedom of expression' respectively protected by sections 15 and 16 of
the Constitution, have been the subject of recent attention by the South
African courts. Section 15(1) provides that 'Everyone has the right to free-
dom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.' Section 16(1)
provides that 'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes-(a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive
or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d)
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.' The prominence of
the right to religious belief in South Africa is shown in another Bill of Rights
provision protecting 'Cultural, religious and linguistic communities'.
Members of such communities may not be denied the right: 'to enjoy their
culture, practice their religion and use their language' and 'to form, join and
maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of
civil society'.110 A provision concerned with language rights in the
Founding Provisions of the Constitution is also relevant: this requires the
Pan South African Language Board to promote and ensure respect for
, Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used for religious purposes
in South Africa.'111
The Constitutional Court has followed Canadian jurisprudence in arriv-
ing at a detailed definition of the right of freedom of religion. In ascribing
meaning to a provision similar to section 15 in the interim Constitution,
Chaskalson P quoted the following definition of Dickson CJC112 and went
on to say 'I cannot offer a better definition than this of the main attributes
of freedom of religion.'113
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such reli-
gious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and~
110 Section 31(1)(a)&(b).
111 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, s 6(5)(b)(ii).
112 In the Big M case; see above n 74.
113 S V Lawrence; S V Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) para 92.
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without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to maintain religious belief by
worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Educationl14 Sachs J also
quoted the Dickson definition-as applicable to section 15. In Prince v
President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope,115 it is para-
phrased by Ngcobo J and quoted again, in a footnote.
2. Prince
In the Prince case a Rastafarian, qualified to practice as an attorney, sought
to overturn the Cape Law Society's blocking of his application to enter legal
practice on the basis of convictions for possession of cannabis and his
declared intention to continue illegal use of the drug. The appellant sought
to have the ban on cannabis declared unconstitutional on the grounds that
'the holy herb' was an intrinsic part of his religion, and the ban infringed
his right to religion. The Constitutional Court was split with five judges
against and four for the appeal.
The majority judgment contains a lengthy section under the heading
'Foreign law' in which potentially influential decisions are looked at in
some detail, in no sense a 'window-dressing' exercise. The 1990 US
Supreme Court case of Smith116 was concerned with the possible use of a
proscribed substance (Peyote) for religious purposes by the Native
American Church. In the classic manner of Anglo-American judicial reason-
ing, the decision in Smith was influential as a precedent because it enabled
the Court to identify a point of distinction. In the process of reasoning
concerned, the Court in effect rejected the basis adopted by the majority in
Smith-that a concession would open the floodgates to a multitude of
exemptions from neutral laws of general application-preferring the minor-
ity approach 'more consistent with the requirements of our
Constitution'.117 The minority in Smith approached the matter from a
much more specific perspective. Peyote has an unpleasant taste and there is
no general demand for it. For this reason an exemption would not involve
any compromise of general state interests in drug control. But, of course,
this did not apply to cannabis in the South African context. From the point
of view of thoroughness of approach it is worth noting that the Court
114 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) para 18. In this case the Court conducted a wide comparative
survey on the issue of corporal punishment in independent schools before concluding in favour
of 'the generality of the law in the face of the appellant's claim for a constitutionally compelled
exemption' (para 52).
115 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) para 38, n 45.
116 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872
(1990).
117 Para 122.
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referred to American law review comment critical of the decision in
Smith.118 A receptive approach to juristic writings is, of course, traditional
in the South Mrican judicial process.119
A separate opinion by minority judge Sachs120 brings in a wide range of
comparative material. Sachs in particular makes use of German jurispru-
dence to argue for 'limited decriminalisation in appropriately controlled
circumstances which could effectively balance the particular interests at
stake, namely, sacramental use. ..and general enforcement of the prohibi-
tion'.121
3. Islamic Unity
In Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority,122 the
Constitutional Court allowed a direct appeal on a constitutional issue
involving freedom of expression-with a certain religious twist. The consti-
tutionality of a provision in a 'Code of Conduct for Broadcasting Services'
was in issue as a possible limitation on the right to freedom of expression.
The broadly worded provision prohibits broadcasting 'which is indecent or
obscene or offensive to public morals or offensive to the religious convic-
tions or feelings ...or likely to prejudice the safety of the State or the
public order or relations between sections of the population.'123 The back-
ground was a complaint by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies
against a local Islamic radio station broadcast which denied aspects of the
holocaust and questioned the legitimacy of Israel.
In arriving at a decision which in effect provided for the rewriting of the
Broadcasting Code provision, the Court gave primary emphasis to the
circumstances of South Africa. Referring to a diverse society-'for many
centuries. ..sorely divided, not least through laws and practices which
encouraged hatred and fear' -the Court noted that the Constitutional
demands of fairness and diversity of views was 'hardly surprising in a coun-
try still riddled with a legacy of inequalities, and in which not all have equal
access to and control of resources, including the electronic media.'124 In the
circumstances of an interpretation of freedom of expression with primary
118 Para 120, above n 18.
119 See Hahlo and Kahn, above n 15, 324-5: 'But though they are not authoritative, the
views of legal write~-be they judges in an extra mural capacity, teache~ of law or practi-
tioners-may prove of considerable persuasive force for a judge having to enunciate a rule of
law.'
120 In the 19705 Albie Sachs held an academic post in the Faculty of Law, Unive~ity of
Southampton.121 Para 165.
122 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (5) SCLR 433.
123 Section 2(a), Schedule 1, to the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993.
124 2002 (5) SCLR 433, para 45.
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regard to perceived domestic need, it follows that scope for meaningful
comparison is limited. But the strong ethos of a comparative approach
prevailed and the Court as it were, 'set the scene' by reference to foreign
material on the right to freedom of expression. Although a range of us and
ECHR material is referred to, its role is the general one of identifying the
values of 'pluralism and broadmindedness ...central to an open and demo-
cratic society.'
The use of comparative material may be contrasted between the Prince
and Islamic Unity cases. In the former a specific point is taken from a us
Supreme Court minority opinion and applied in the construction of an
argument leading to the ruling, in the latter the role is the much more
general one of identifying the values and norms of an international first-
world club which South African law sees itself as now belonging to.
4. Khumalo
In Khumalo & Others v Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa,125 another
direct appeal to Constitutional Court, the issue was whether the law of
defamation was inconsistent with the right of freedom of expression. This
issue arose because, in principle, in South African common law, a true state-
ment may be defamatory in the sense of being an injury to dignity.126 Even
though the law has developed a defence of reasonable publication,127 there
is a tension between the protection of freedom of expression under the Bill
of Rights and the protection of dignity-a right also protected by the
Constitution.128 In the Khumalo case a well-known politician took action
for defamation but without alleging falsehood; exception was taken on the
basis that the claim was unconstitutional in that the Bill of Rights protected
the right of the press to publish true facts. Regarding the constitutionality
of defamation O'Regan J noted that: 'we need to ask whether an appropri-
ate balance is struck between the protection of freedom of expression, on
the one hand, and the value of human dignity on the other'.
On the central issue whether the common law was inconsistent with the
Constitution considerable use is made of comparative jurisprudence;
indeed, the Court builds its argument on foreign case law. A Canadian
125 Khumalo & Others v Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa" 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC).
126 The civilian basis of South African defamation in the actio iniurian4m means that injury to
dignity may be actionable even if there is no injury to reputation because the material published
is true; see, generally, JM Burchell, Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern
Actio Injuriarum (Cape Town: Juta, 1998) (cited in Khumalo, para 17, above n 14 ).
127 See National Media Led and Others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) 1207-8.
128 See s 10: 'Everone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and
protected.'
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dictum is applied,129 supported by a reference to German law,130 to arrive
at the position that the protection of freedom of expression has no more
than an attenuated interest in falsehoods. On the point that it is frequently
difficult, if not impossible, to establish veracity, the Court quotes a us
Supreme Court dissenting dictum stating that the passage of time 'may
make it impossible. ..to disprove malicious gossip about past conduct'.131
The point that this difficulty may have a 'chilling effect' on readiness to
publish is supported by a quotation from a House of Lords speech of Lord
Keith where that expression is used,132 the point being backed up by a
reference to an Australian case.133 The scene having been set in this way,
Brennan J's well-known US Supreme Court opinion134 representing 'the
high-water mark of foreign jurisprudence protecting the freedom of speech'
is quoted, but subject to the observation that 'many jurisdictions have
declined to follow it'.135 In support of this questioning of the Brennan opin-
ion, O'Regan J cites a vast assembly of Canadian, English, Australian and
German case law and literature.136
This decision is a very strong example of comparative law in a positive
role. In the construction of O'Regan J's opinion foreign jurisprudence goes
to core substance in a fundamental way. The way the opinion is written
means that it could not stand without the comparative part; to this extent
the decision would appear to exemplify the most far-reaching application of
the comparative method.
c. Right to Equality
1. Basic position
Hardly a matter for surprise, the South African Constitution gives high
prominence to the right of equality. The first of the founding provisions
makes reference in its first two subsections to 'the achievement of equality'
and 'non-racism and non-sexism',137 The famously extensive right of equal-
ity in the Bill of Rights covers: 'race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth'.138
129 Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 129 (SCC) at para 106.
130 54 BverfGE 208 (1980) (the Boll case).
131 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps (1985) 475 US 767,785-6.
132 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] 1 All ER 1011 (HL) 1018.
133 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd and Another (1994) 124 ALR 1, 19-20.
134 New York Times Go v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254,279-80.
135 Khumalo, para 40. 136 Para 40, above n 41.
137 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 1 (a)&(b).
138 Section 9 (3); the listed grounds of unfair discrimination is more extensive than in the
interim Constitution (s 8(2)IC), pregnancy, marital status and birth having been added.
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The racial discrimination for which South Africa was notorious was
excised from the statute book as part of the process of reform.139 Its legacy
is a economic and social imbalance that is the country's most pressing prob-
lem. This inequality is addressed by the so-called 'economic and social
rights'140 in provisions in which the state's obligation to deliver human
rights is interpreted in the context of the concept of 'available resources'
and the notion of 'progressive realisation'.141 The difficulty of finding rele-
vant comparative material has been mentioned in the context of the
Grootboom case.142
A small sample from the area of the right not to be subject to unfair state
discrimination in matters of sexual orientation will be considered as
evidence of the use of comparative law under the equality head.
2. Gay rights
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister
for Justice and others143 the Constitutional Court ruled on a challenge to
laws proscribing certain forms of sexual act as unfair discrimination. Even
in the decision of the Court of first instancel44 there is significant recourse
to foreign material; for present purposes, however, consideration will be
limited to the decision of the Constitutional Court. Ackermann J observed
that '[t]here is nothing in the jurisprudence of other open and democratic
societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom' to gainsay the
conclusion that honestly held views on sexual matters 'cannot influence
what the Constitution dictates in regard to discrimination on the grounds
of sexual orientation'.145 Proceeding to look at the case law of some of
these other societies, the outcome does seem to have been influenced by the
finding that 'in many of these countries there has been a definite trend
towards decriminalisation'.146
Noting the decriminalisation of sodomy in England and Wales in 1967
and in Scotland in 1980, the Court considered the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in finding the surviving sodomy laws of Northern
Ireland 147 and Ireland148 to be in breach of the protection of privacy under
Article 8. In applying the decision as comparative authority, Ackermann J
139 See, eg, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991.
140 See de Wet, above n 40.
141 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, in respect of housing s 26 (2); in
respect of health care, food, water and social security s 27 (2).
142 See above n 90. 143 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
144 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice and
others [1998] 3 All SA 26 (W).
145 Paras 38-9. 146 Para 39.
147 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
148 Norris v Republic of Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186.
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notes that while the European 'margin of appreciation' factor makes denial
of infringement decisions problematical,149 in cases of a finding of breach,
it strengthens the comparative authority because it 'suggests that there must
be a very clear breach'.150
The opinion goes on to canvass a wide range of comparative material
demonstrating the powerful tide of decriminalisation that occurred
throughout the Western world in the second half of the twentieth century.
Availability of sources is obviously relevant to the scope of comparative
surveys; in this regard the Court seems to have been assisted bya mono-
graph mentioned in the footnotes.151 The comparative survey is the basis of
the Court's conclusion that 'in 1967 [decriminalisation in England and
Wales] a process of change commenced in Western democracies in legal atti-
tudes towards sexual orientation.'152
Having adopted a liberal sexuality norm on the basis of western decrim-
inalisation, the Court proceeds to reject the decision in Bowers v Hardwick
in which a divided US Supreme Court found itself 'unpersuaded that the
sodomy laws of some 25 states should be invalidated',153 The primary basis
for this rejection of a potentially significant precedent is that:
Our 1996 Constitution differs so substantially, as far as the present issue is
concerned, from that of the United States of America that the majority judgement
in Bowers can really offer us no assistance in the construction and application of
our own Constitution.154
The Court went on to state that the rejection of the criminalisation of
sodomy in a 'number of open and democratic' societies operated to 'fortify
the conclusion which I have reached that the limitation in question in our
law regarding such criminalisation cannot be justified under section 36(1}
of the 1996 Constitution'.
The confident position of the Court in its application of foreign material
to the issue to some extent conveys the impression that it is looking for
backing rather than guidance from foreign jurisprudence. Part of the reason
for this is the fact of relatively well-developed South African literature,155
especially a South African Law Journal article156 much relied on by the
149 As the Constitutional Court observed in S v Makwanyane., above n 16, para 109.
150 Para 41.
151 R Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
see para 45, n 62 where this work is cited in support of statistical details regarding the wide-
spread decriminalisation of sodomy.
152 Para 52. 153 Para 53. 154 Para 55.
155 See my comments in 'South Africa: a World in one Country on the Long Road to Reality',
in A Harding and E 6riicii, Comparative Law in the 21st Century (London: Kluwer, 2002),
281,298-9156 E Cameron 'Sexual Orietation and the Constitution: a Test Case for Human Rights'
(1993) 110 SAL1450.
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Court-'[i]n what follows I rely heavily on an influential article written by
Professor Edwin Cameron'.157
3. Same-sex life partners
A second major Constitutional Court decision concerned with sexual orien-
tation equality further demonstrates the role of comparative law in the
context of evolving human rights' jurisprudence. In this case the revision of
norms in jurisdictions perceived to share essentially similar values was
significant. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Home A(fairsl58 addressed the constitutionality of immigration legisla-
tion159 giving entry to 'spouses' of permanent residents but denying it to
gays and lesbians in 'same-sex life partnerships' with permanent resi-
dents.160
The opinion makes early reference to 'an important line of decisions of
the Zimbabwean Supreme Court' holding that 'the constitutional right of
citizens to freedom of movement is contravened when foreign national
spouses. ..are denied permission to reside'.161 Ackermann J saw it as
important that the contravention in the Zimbabwean cases was considered
apropos of a citizen spouse residing in Zimbabwe, but an unstated southern
Mrican affinity factor seems a more likely basis for referring to the decision.
Like the earlier National Coalition case, the significance of this decision,
for present purposes, lies in the prominent role of foreign jurisprudence in
the decision-making process-on both the substantive bill of rights issue
and on the mechanism for correction. Observing that '[i]n other countries
a significant change in societal and legal attitudes to same-sex partnerships
in the context of what is considered to constitute a family has occurred',162
the Court noted shifts in the jurisprudence in Canada, Israel, the UK and
the USA. On the critical issue of the justification for recourse to the
jurisprudence concerned, the Court observed:
In referring to these judgements from the highest Courts of other jurisdictions I do
not overlook the different nature of their histories, legal systems and constitutional
context ...Nevertheless, these judgements give expression to norms and values in
other open and democratic societies based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom-an important source from which to illuminate our understanding of the
Constitution and the promotion of its informing norms.163
157 Para 20. 158 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
159 Section 25 (5) Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991. 160 Para 1.
161 Para 28. 162 Para 48.
163 Ibid; the last sentence of this quotation refers, in n 69, to the two relevant subsections of
s 39(1) of the Constitution: 'When interpreting the Bil1 of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom (Court's italics) ...(c) may consider foreign law.'
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The Court placed particular reliance on Canadian jurisprudence concerned
with overlapping categories of discrimination as well as the notion of equal-
ity and its application to the definition of the concept of family. Quotations
from Canadian judgments are integral to the structure of Ackerman J's
opinion.164 The reliance on Canadian law in this case is striking. A number
of pivotal aspects of the argument are supported by quotations from
Canadian case law.
Having determined that the legislative provision concerned was uncon-
stitutional, the Court also brought foreign jurisprudence to bear on the
issue of an appropriate remedy. On the decision to 'read in' words to
correct the offending section, the Court was 'strengthened in this conclu-
sion by the fact that in several jurisdictions Courts have held that they do
possess the power to read words into statutes where appropriate'.165
Reference is made to the adoption of this power by the courts in Canada
and the USA, as well as by the Israeli Supreme Court and the German
Constitutional Court.166 The Court quotes passages from and adopts the
argument presented in an American law review article critical of the
premise that there is no constitutional norm to guide a process of judicial
remedy selection.167 From the mention of a possible separation of powers'
tension between the Supreme Court and Congress, it is apparent that the
article is concerned with the US position. That the South African
Constitutional Court recognised this is shown by the emphasis on the terms
and needs of 'our Constitution' in the paragraph following the quota-
tion.168 This raises the issue of the point of the inclusion of the law review
material. In the absence of a 'technical affinity' justification for recourse to
academic work on the US model it is not easy to see what purpose is served
by its inclusion.
In Satchwell v The President of the Republic of South Africa,169 a High
Court judge claimed unfair discrimination on the basis that regulations
regarding her employment did not treat her permanent female life-partner
in the same way as a judge's spouse. The issue was the constitutionality of
legislation, which 'effectively excluded all those in relationships other than
heterosexual marriages from the benefits it accords to spouses'.170 In arriv-
ing at a decision in favour of the applicant, the Court refers to Canadian~
164 See para 40, Canada v Mossop (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 658; para 43, Vriend v Alberta
(1998) 156 DLR (4th) 385; para 44, Law v Canada (1999) 170 DLR (4th) 1; para 52, Mossop
~ain.165 Para 71. 166 Ibid.
167 Para 72: the article is EH Camiker ' A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive
Statutes' (1985-6) 95 Yale Law ]ournaI1185.
168 Para 73.
169 Satchwell v The President of The Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 Case ccr
45/01
170 Para 10.
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and its own, earlier, dicta in support of a wide definition of 'family'.
Reference is also made to a South African law review article171 in support
of the following statement:
In certain African traditional societies woman-to-woman marriages are not
unknown, this being prevalent in families that are childless because the woman is
barren or where the woman is in a powerful position in her community, like being
a queen or a chieftainess, or where she is very wealthy.172
This is a rare instance of some element of African perspective being brought
into the reckoning even though it is simply tended in support of a position
contended for on the basis of specific Canadian authority.
ill. CONCLUSION: FLOURISJllNG COMPARA11VE LAW
South African judges are making widespread use of comparative law in the
development of the scope of protected human rights. In general the treat-
ment is sophisticated. Two associated factors are probably relevant: a
strong domestic academic groundwork contribution and positive reliance
on this work by the higher courts. While individual judges differ in their
approach to the use of foreign precedents, the 'may consider foreign law'
provision concerning the interpretation of the Bill of Rights has produced a
generally receptive attitude to foreign material.
The South African Law Reports, published by Juta, carries at the end of
each monthly issue, two separate lists {since 1987) of case annotations: one
for South African and another for foreign cases. The labels 'applied',
'compared', 'considered' and 'referred to' indicate the use of each case in
the reported decision. This list-alphabetical by country-gives a useful
indication of the foreign case law appearing, in one role or another, in the
SALR. It has always been the case, and remains so, that the majority of the
foreign cases made use of are decisions of the English courts. Although
South African common law is civilian, English law has had significant influ-
ence,173 largely in areas of active development; contract, commercial and
company law, and judicial review are random examples. What is significant
for present purposes is the appreciable increase in foreign material being
referred to by reason of the Bill of Rights. American, Australian, Canadian,
Indian and German jurisprudence appears on a regular basis.
171 B Oomen 'Traditional Woman-to- Woman Marriages, and the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act' (2000) 63 rnRHR (Tydskrif van Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg), 274.
172 Para 12
173 B Beinart 'The English law Contribution in South Africa: the Interaction of Civil and
Common law' (1981) Acta Juridica 7.
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The law of northern African states is conspicuous by its absence.174 In
the-admittedly limited-materiallooked at, the African perspective came
up only at a general level, unsupported by primary source authority.175
Customary law has a place in the Constitution alongside the common
law.176 But while one might take the view that its development calls for
input from African jurisdictions representative of African legal thinking,
there are certain difficulties. There is no single customary law, not even
within one jurisdiction. Also, the different colonial origins and post-colo-
nial developments in the various African jurisdictions, together with the
fact that in many instances there is not much in the way of reported legal
material, makes it difficult to source comparative material.
The necessarily limited survey of this chapter indicates an active compar-
ative law factor in the development of human rights law. A cursory look at
the SALR foreign law annotation tables, referred to above, in the years
since South Africa first adopted a Bill of Rights indicates a steady increase
in recourse to foreign material. The publisher's system of classification gives
some indication of the significance of particular instances. The research
done for this chapter indicates a spectrum of use from citations that are
tantamount to being cosmetic, to cases of direct application to some central
substantive issue. It is suggested that the level of use of foreign jurispru-
dence could be classified by reference to at least four specifically evaluative
criteria: 'illustrative'; 'supplementary'; 'elucidatory'; and, 'going to core
substance'. The significance and dimension of the ever-developing South
African comparative approach commented on in this chapter is a phenom-
enon that warrants comprehensive research and study as one of the success
stories of comparative law in the new millennium.
174 The decisions of the High and Supreme Courts of Namibia and Zimbabwe-jurisdictions
of the Roman-Dutch common law-are reported in the SALR.
175 See above n 172.
176 See, eg, s 39(2); see also, generally, C Himonga and C Bosch, 'The Application of Mrican
Customary Law under the Constitution of South Africa' (2000) 117 South African Law
]ournal306.
